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INTERGENERATIONAL CONDEMNATION
Donald H. Gjerdingen*
Justice between generations is a growing concern in land use, par-
ticularly in the areas of environmental and historic preservation. In this
Article, Professor Gerdingen addresses the effect of this development on
contemporary takings clause doctrine. He argues that conventional tak-
ings doctrine is comprised of four different "causes of action" that
merely focus on intragenerational conflicts over the use of resources. As
a result, part of the reason why the law generates so many hard cases in
the area of environmental and historic preservation is that the conven-
tional takings doctrine is unable to accommodate the justice between
generations component of preservation issues. In response, he proposes
the recognition of a new takings cause of action-that of "intergenera-
tional condemnation." The final portion of the Article sets forth a modi-
fied utilitarian model for an intergenerational condemnation cause of
action.
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INTRODUCTION
Land use in the United States has always been an uneasy partner-
ship between private property and public control. Private land owner-
ship remains the predominant means of encouraging efficient use of
resources, although public control is increasingly regarded as necessary
for the control of future growth. Yet amidst all the dialogue about con-
trol of critical areas, zoning, and wilderness preservation, what is being
overlooked is that land use is also becoming something more-an uneasy
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partnership between present and future generations. In an increasing
number of areas, justice between generations has replaced mere in-
tragenerational resource conflicts as an important concern. At the same
time, the legal culture's interpretation of the takings clause-the modem
placeholder for the basic societal ground rules for the regulation of prop-
erty-is implicitly limited to resource conflicts between members of the
present generation. The purpose of this Article is to begin to explore this
problem and its impact on takings clause jurisprudence.
As an introduction to the problem, Section I provides an overview
of conventional takings doctrine. Two basic themes are considered.
First, existing takings doctrine can only be understood in light of the
political structures of the Civil War-to-1937 and post-1937 periods of
American law. This initial theme illustrates not only the general connec-
tion between politics and substantive legal categories, but also the con-
nection between the politics of each period and the purpose served by
concepts of the takings clause, such as the meaning of "public" and "pri-
vate," the nature of "property," and the role of the state. Second, cur-
rent takings law, because it represents a blend of both periods, cannot be
structured around a unified theory. Rather, it is a placeholder for four
distinct types of causes of action; some represent a carryover of the psy-
chological features of common law thought, others represent distinctive
problems related to modem concepts of the state.
Section II then considers the relationship between these conven-
tional causes of action and some of the emerging problems associated
with environmental and historic preservation. The thesis of this Section
is that all of the existing causes of action under the takings clause are
limited to intragenerational resource conflicts. At the same time, how-
ever, land use is increasingly a matter of justice between generations. As
a result, part of the tension in takings clause doctrine is related to the
inability of conventional legal categories to accommodate questions of
justice between generations. To develop this thesis, the first part of Sec-
tion II considers the relationship between conventional legal categories
and the new class of market failures associated with environmental and
historic preservation. Two types of market failures are considered-in-
tragenerational and intergenerational, both of which are present in the
typical preservation case. Conventional notions of private property and
the takings clause are unable to accommodate both kinds of market fail-
ures. While most of the recent innovative proposals for takings doctrine
deal with intragenerational market failures, little has been done to deal
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with intergenerational market failures. To illustrate the significance of
this problem in the contemporary analysis of preservation issues, the sec-
ond part of Section II considers the legal reasoning used in two landmark
land use cases, Just v. Marinette County and Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City. The conclusion of Section II is that if takings
clause jurisprudence is to respond to the growing issue of justice between
generations, a new takings clause cause of action must be recognized-
that of "intergenerational condemnation."
Section III then sketches out a possible model for an intergenera-
tional condemnation cause of action. As an introduction to the nature of
intergenerational condemnation, the first part of Section III surveys re-
cent scholarly work devoted to the development of a utilitarian model for
takings clause jurisprudence. While initially applied only to conven-
tional takings clause categories, this model could be adapted to deal with
justice between generations in land use. The remaining part of Section
III proposes a modified utilitarian model of intergenerational
condemnation.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TAKINGS CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE-POLITICAL THEORIES AND THE LEGAL
CULTURE
The takings clause of the fifth amendment provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."'
Thus, three central concepts are built into takings clause jurisprudence.
The first concept is a distinction between "public" and "private." This
not only assumes the existence of a distinction between "public" and
"private" activities, but also prohibits the taking of "private property"
for a mere "private" use, even though compensation would be paid. The
second concept focuses on what constitutes a "taking" and what can be
considered "property"; the nature of property itself must be considered
in light of what serves as a taking of that property. The final concept,
"just" compensation, underscores the absence of a textual requirement
that all takings be compensated and the concomitant notion that com-
pensation for a taking is mandated only where it is "just" to do so. To
understand the relationship of the takings clause to intergenerational jus-
tice, it first is necessary to trace the interpretation of these concepts dur-
ing two different periods of American law, the Civil War-to-1937 period
and the post-1937 period. The interpretation of the takings clause during
I. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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each period not only reflects the dominant political expectations of each
period, but also the nature of legal thought during each period.
A. The Invisible Hand State and the Public/Private Distinction-The
Takings Clause During the Period of Substantive Due Process
Legal consciousness during the Civil War-to-1937 period presup-
posed two separate and independent spheres, one private, the other pub-
lie.2 The private sphere included those activities that were off-limits to
the state, while the public sphere included those activities that were legit-
imate interests of the state.
On the one hand, the state could not redistribute wealth, change
bargaining power, regulate the market, or concern itself with the validity
of the existing social structure (e.g., existing structures of power in soci-
ety).3 These areas represented private areas off-limits to the state and,
accordingly, influenced the concept of individual rights in the era of sub-
stantive due process.
On the other hand, the state could regulate according to the "police
power," which defined most of the content of the public sphere.4 The use
of the police power, however, fit in closely with the political philosophy
of the period and influenced legal concepts of legitimate state regulation.
Under the police power, the state could regulate private relationships
only for three possible reasons. The first reason was the idea of a public
good. According to this standard, the state could only take a person's
money (through taxation)' or property (through eminent domain)6 if the
purpose of the regulation was to benefit the public rather than a private
group or a subgroup of the public. Thus, the use of the taxing power or
the takings power was legitimate for projects used by the public (such as
roads) or open to the public (such as schools and public buildings)7 or
even projects for private businesses so long as those businesses were of a
2. See, eg., Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1425-28 (1982). See generally Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1289 (1982).
3. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 24-28 (1984); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAV §§ 8-1 to -3 (1978).
4. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 572-97 (1868); E.
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904); C.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1886).
5. See, e.g., Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); T. COOLEY, supra note 4, at
487-94.
6. See, eg., T. COOLEY, supra note 4, at 530-36.
7. See, e.g., C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 4, at 379-80.
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benefit to the public at large and were open to the public at large.8 The
latter category, usually deemed businesses "affected with a public inter-
est," was analogous to the common law category of common carriers
because such carriers were required to serve all comers and thus could be
said to be open to the public.9 Projects which did not fall into one of
these general categories and which, instead, attempted to claim and later
transfer one person's money or property to a particular subgroup of the
public were deemed class legislation. As such, these projects were sus-
pect since they constituted a redistribution of wealth (i.e., the state taking
something from person A and giving it to person B for the personal bene-
fit of B). 10 It was also required that persons be treated equally as mem-
bers of the public. Accordingly, legislation that favored one segment of
the public at the expense of another was suspect.11
The second reason for the regulation of private relationships was
grounded in the promotion of the general "health, safety, and welfare."12
This category, much like the public/private distinction, required a benefit
for the public at large.13 In addition, it also emphasized physical dan-
ger. 4 As a result, this standard covered such things as unclean bread 5
or disease,16 since both of these problems posed harm to the general pub-
lic and were physically harmful.
The third reason, usually linked with the second, was to regulate
private relationships for "moral" reasons.1 7 During the Civil War-to-
1937 period, this principle was correlated with the enforcement of the
accepted moral values of the dominant social groups. Thus, if a person
made an unreasonable use of his land (as defined by common sense), it
would be deemed a nuisance." If a person did not follow the expected
norms of the existing social structure he would be punished. The law
8. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
9. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430-39 (1927); E. FREUND, supra note
4, at 397-98.
10. See, eg., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596-97 (1895) (Field, J., concurring); E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 632-
34; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 8-4, at 439.
11. See, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 8-4, at 438-39.
12. See generally E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 109-241.
13. See, eg., id. at 109-24.
14. See, eg., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391-96 (1898) (mining); cf Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918) (goods must be physically harmful before they can be sub-
ject to federal "police power" of commerce clause).
15. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60-62 (1905).
16. See, eg., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination against
smallpox).
17. See, eg., E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 172-241.
18. See, eg., C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 4, at 422-42.
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would not uphold "immoral" contracts19 or "deviant" social practices
(such as being a vagranta° or reading "dirty" books 1 ) and would allow
the states to regulate "bad" things (such as liquor 22 or prostitution23).
Similarly, the dominant social roles of the period were reinforced. Wo-
men "belonged" at home, 4 "illegitimate" children could be ostracized,2 5
and blacks did not "belong" with whites.2 6
Given this background on the politics of the Civil War-to-1937 pe-
riod and the substance of the accepted legal categories, each of the three
concepts of the takings clause-public/private, taking and property, and
just compensation-reflects an interpretation consistent with the domi-
nant political and legal categories of the period. First, the interpretation
of the public/private feature of the takings clause integrated two central
assumptions of this period: distinct public and private spheres and a pro-
hibition on the redistribution of wealth. Consequently, the public use
requirement served as an important limitation on the regulation of prop-
erty by the state.27 Given the restriction on the redistribution of wealth
and the related ban on class legislation, the "public" uses for which prop-
erty could be taken were naturally quite limited.28 Private property
could not be taken for any purpose which would be tantamount to a
redistribution of wealth or which amounted to class legislation since, in
each case, this would constitute a taking of private property for a private
use.
29
Second, property meant common law property and, therefore, typi-
cally meant control over real or reified things.3° Moreover, a "taking,"
19. See, e.g., Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1905) (gambling debts).
20. See, eg., E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 97-100.
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
22. See, eg., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
23. See, e.g., L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
24. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
25. See, eg., W. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS
304-09 (R. Cooley 3d ed. 1921).
26. See, eg., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. See, eg., I J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES 413-14 (2d ed. 1900); H. MILLS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 24-32
(1879).
28. See, eg., I P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 37-78 (2d ed. 1917); Note, The
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 603-07 (1949).
For a good general discussion of the topic of public use, see Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Emi-
nent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1 (1980).
29. See, e.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885); see also P. NICHOLS, supra note 28, at
§§ 79-80.
30. See, e.g., J. LEWIS, supra note 27, at 53-56; see also Vandevelde, The New Property of the
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325,
328-33 (1980).
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consistent with the intuitionistic basis of common law thought, typically
meant either the physical destruction of a thing or the transfer of that
thing to another person.31
Third and consistent with the police power concepts of the period,
compensation was not required when the regulation was within the ac-
cepted police power category, such as the control of noxious uses or nui-
sances.32 In contrast, when the regulation was not based on a police
power category, compensation was required. The requirement of public
use also mitigated the consequences of a police power regulation, since it
required that the benefit for which the property was to be used be one for
the public at large (including, of course, the person from whom it was
taken) rather than for the benefit of a particular group.
B. The Rise of the Activist State and the Takings Clause
With the demise of the Lochner era and the rise of the activist state,
the preceding takings clause structure changed significantly in several
ways. First, common law property became subject to numerous new eco-
nomic regulations. For example, validation of zoning in 192633 gave rise
to the regulation of land for reasons other than traditional police power
rationales (such as noxious use).34 As a result, it became much more
difficult to determine whether property had been "taken" because such
regulation did not fall into accepted common law categories and only
restricted the use of land or diminished its economic value rather than
causing physical destruction or a change in ownership. 35 Second, redis-
tribution of wealth became permissible.36 This necessarily meant the
blurring of the public/private distinction because private property could
now be taken for the benefit of subgroups of the public. 37 Third, the state
could regulate the market for reasons other than the promotion of the
police power. Legislation aimed at making a more efficient allocation of
resources or a more equitable distribution of wealth was now permissi-
31. See, eg., J. LEwis, supra note 27, at 53-70.
32. See, eg., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 546-47; P.
NICHOLS, supra note 28, at 284-87.
33. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
34. See, eg., I P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.03 (1984).
35. See, eg., Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Takings I1].
36. Compare, eg., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S, 548 (1937) (unemployment compensa-
tion upheld) with, eg., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936) ("The word [tax] has never been
thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another.").
37. Compare, eg., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) with, e.g.,
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557-59 (1923).
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ble.38 Fourth, the nature of property necessarily changed to include
rights between people with respect to things rather than merely rights in
things (i.e., reification).39 Fifth, the nature of the state changed from a
mere night watchman to one, in part, of bureaucracies having control
over the welfare of citizens and a potential for abuse of discretion.'
The end result of these changes was that (1) the private/public dis-
tinction no longer served as an independent limitation;4 (2) "property"
included more than common law property; and (3) whether government
action was a "taking" could depend on whether the regulation was justi-
fied on the basis of efficiency or redistribution of wealth and on whether
there was a need to control abuse of discretion by government officials.4 2
C. The Present Four-Part Mosaic of Takings Doctrine
Current takings clause doctrine is a strange mixture of the invisible
hand state and the activist state periods. On the one hand, post-1937
developments have given rise to the need to consider such issues as gov-
ernmental aggrandizement and the development of Hohfeldian concepts
of property. On the other hand, it is still very hard to dislodge the deep,
intuitionistic notions held by laypersons about when the government has
"taken" a person's "thing." Thus, modern takings clause doctrine does
not display a unified doctrine; rather, it is a mixture of four different
types of takings "causes of action."'43 Individually, each cause of action
displays the markings of one of the two periods more than the other;
collectively, they represent the tensions between accommodating modem
38. See, eg., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (1984) (use of takings clause
arguments to challenge government action taken to correct "market failure" and to break up
oligopoly).
39. See, eg., Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 69 (J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1980); Vandevelde, supra note 30, at 357-67.
40. See, eg., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
41. See, eg., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-31 (1984) (transfer of real
property from lessors to lessees to reduce concentration of land ownership); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954) (use of private enterprise for development of blighted areas); Note, The Public
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 611-14 (1949); see
also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 8-5, at 444-46. But see Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The
Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. Cr. Rav. 351, 365-69 (argues for continued recognition of
limitation).
42. See, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 9-4, at 463-64.
43. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the
most recent major statement by the Supreme Court on the takings doctrine, the validity of all four
causes of action was recognized. See id. at 124 (physical invasion), 127-28 (rendering useless) (Type
I); id. at 125-27 (Type II); id. at 125 (Type III); id. at 128 (Type IV). The landowners in Penn
Central then proceeded to make arguments based on Types I, III, and IV, all of which failed. See id.
at 128-31 (Type I); id. at 131-35 (zoning and possibility of discrimination), 133-35 (reciprocity lack-
ing), 135 n.32 (check on arbitrary official action) (Type III); id. at 135 (aggrandizement) (Type IV).
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concepts of property and the state with categories of conventional legal
thought.
1. Type I-"You Took My Thing"
The first kind of takings cause of action (Type I) corresponds to
intuitionistic notions of "taking my thing" and is a carryover from the
pre-1937 era. Despite the infusion of Hohfeldian notions of property into
legal thought, the intuitionistic notion that the state has acted improperly
when it has "taken" a person's "thing" continues to be a central part of
takings doctrine.4 While the genesis of these concepts in the era of sub-
stantive due process certainly had important political connotations at the
time, the enduring nature of these concepts in contemporary legal
thought is perhaps best explained in nonpolitical terms by the difficulty
in structuring any legal system that would try to dislodge the intuitionis-
tic notions that laypersons have about property.45
Under this cause of action, three basic concepts are central. First,
property is typically a physical thing.46 In addition, property rights are
reified; that is, people are typically assumed to have rights that are lo-
cated in physical objects.47 As a result, the Hohfeldian concept of prop-
erty, which treats property as merely the regulation by the state of rights
between people with respect to things (such as basic economic regula-
tion), is disfavored.48 Second and also consistent with intuitionistic no-
44. See, eg., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
45. See Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 711, 741-46 (1983).
46. See, eg., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 & n.10 (1946) (airspace above land
as property).
47. See, eg., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 26-27, 116-45, 244 n.31; Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1184-85 & nn.37 & 41 (1967).
48. The current strength of this position on the Supreme Court is evident in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Six Justices took the position that a "per-
manent physical occupation of property" constitutes a taking "without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner," Id. at
434-35. Emphasizing that "[iJn such a case, the property owner entertains a historically rooted
expectation of compensation," id. at 441, the majority stressed the interference with dominion over a
physical thing. Id. at 432-38. In contrast, the three dissenting Justices, showing obvious discomfort
with the majority's use of reification, found the per se takings rule used by the majority to be
"uniquely unsuited to the modem urban age." Id. at 447 (Blackmun, Brennan & White, JJ., dissent-
ing). This case is of particular importance because of the obvious conflict between the majority and
the dissent about the nature of "property" itself. The majority seems to treat the owner's interest as
dominion over a physical thing; in contrast, the dissent is more comfortable perceiving the matter in
Hohfeldian terms, as one involving an "entitlement" protected by a "liability rule." See Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089, 1092, 1105-06 (1972).
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tions of property, an "easy" case for a taking has occurred whenever the
state has physically invaded the property, physically destroyed it, or
transferred it to someone else.49 A "hard" case occurs whenever the
state so restricts the use of the property that the owner cannot use it or
get access to it so that, even though the state has not actually transferred
or destroyed the property, it has, in effect, "rendered it useless."5 Third,
the "state" is also reified. In determining whether the state has taken
property, it is assumed (consistent with intuitionistic notions) that the
state exists in certain places and in certain people. The taking com-
plained of, therefore, must be by someone who clearly works for the
state. Similarly, the criterion for determining whether there has been a
taking by the state is to ask whether, in essence, a layperson would label
the action complained of a taking if a private person had done the same
thing.51
2. Type II-Noxious Use
The second takings cause of action (Type II) is the "noxious use" or
common law nuisance analogy. This variety, which dominated the sub-
stantive due process era, allows the state to take property without paying
for it if, based on prevailing standards of dominant social expectations,
the owner was using it improperly.52 This would include engaging in
unneighborly acts,53 creating a threat of physical danger or disease to the
public,54 or using property to further socially unacceptable activities such
as crime. 55 The corresponding hard cases under this cause of action typi-
cally involve either difficulty in the designation of what constitutes a de-
49. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); L. TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 9-3, at 460 & n.2; see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 123-36.
50. See, eg., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (no takings found despite severe
restrictions placed on use of lawfully acquired eagles because some limited economic use remains);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978) (dictum) (regulation must
not be so severe that enterprise is no longer "economically viable"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922) (takings occurred when state, in effect, denied owner of subsur-
face interest access to property); see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 136-45; L. TRIBE, supra
note 3, § 9-3, at 460.
51. See, e.g., Gjerdingen, supra note 45, at 744-45; cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982) (influence of similar factor in determining whether state action exists). This, for example,
seems to explain such decisions as Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (takings clause did not
apply to entitlement program).
52. See, eg., E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 546-51.
53. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (dangerous quarry in resi-
dential area).
54. See, e.g., North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)
(seizure of contaminated food).
55. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (forfei-
ture of yacht used for smuggling upheld even though owner innocent); cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123
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viant activity (particularly after 1937)56 or marginal application of
acknowledged categories.57
3. Type III-Classical Zoning
The third takings cause of action is based on the classical zoning
paradigm (Type III). This cause of action is a transitional category be-
cause it draws support from both the Lochner and modem eras. Even
though initially validated in the latter part of the substantive due process
era, it has continued, in part, because it also deals well with additional
concerns relevant to the character of the modem state. The classical Eu-
clidean zoning paradigm provided the Lochner era Court with a rela-
tively hard case.5" On the one hand, the restriction on the use of
property that followed from the zoning decision by the state seemed to
interfere with the right of the owner to exercise physical autonomy over
his property. 59 Moreover, it seemed to restrict the property on the basis
of group characteristics rather than on the acts of individual property
owners.6" On the other hand, the restriction of development was related
to the dominant understanding of police power, which emphasized physi-
cal safety and public health.61 At the same time, the "reciprocity of ad-
vantage" present in the classical zoning paradigm mitigated claims of a
taking by providing some type of compensation in kind.6
While these aspects of the classical zoning paradigm were primarily
keyed to concepts dominant in the Lochner era, the classical zoning para-
digm reinforced some additional concerns about the power of state offi-
cials, a power that would become particularly acute after 1937.
Following the demise of the Lochner era, the acceptable political basis for
regulation expanded beyond the dominant social expectations which
U.S. 623, 661-70 (1887) (prohibition of manufacturing or sale of intoxicating liquor upheld under
takings power even though it rendered property of existing breweries useless).
56. See, eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (use of zoning power to
define nature of "family"); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (exclusionary zoning); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zon-
ing for "adult" theatres).
57. See, eg., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (open spacing zoning vis-a-vis
classical zoning paradigm); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131-35 (1978)
(historical preservation vis-a-vis classical zoning paradigm).
58. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (6-3 decision).
59. See Vandevelde, supra note 30, at 328-33.
60. And thus, in essence, raised some aspects of liability without individual wrongdoing or
fault.
61. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 391-95.
62. The presence of implicit compensation continues to be an important factor in the interpre-
tation of the takings clause by conservatives. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 147-50 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Epstein, supra note 41, at 372-80.
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were present in the concept of "police power" to include a wide variety of
concerns related to social and economic policy.6 3 Predictably, this in-
creased power of the state brought with it the greater possibility for abuse
of power by those who enforced its decisions. In this respect, the require-
ment in the classical zoning paradigm of general applicability over a
large geographic area helped to limit abuse of discretion by officials. This
aspect of the classical zoning paradigm, which has been termed the equal
protection component 64 of the takings clause, protects against the sin-
gling out of individual property owners for special treatment. As such, it
serves as a safeguard against the use of governmental economic regula-
tion to favor individual landowners (thus lessening somewhat the incen-
tives for corruption) or to discriminate against individual property
owners (thus lessening the possibility for discrimination).65
4. Type IV-Government Aggrandizement
The fourth takings clause cause of action (Type IV) is based on bu-
reaucratic aggrandizement. First introduced into the takings clause liter-
ature by Joseph Sax in the 1960's,66 the subsequent recognition and use
of this category by the Supreme Court 67 can be linked to a change in the
nature of the state after 1937. The rise of the activist state, with its in-
creased potential for governmental correction of market failures and the
rearrangement of property rights for the purposes of wealth redistribu-
tion,68 brought with it an increased potential for abuse of power by the
government. In the era of substantive due process, the state itself had no
special role to play over and above the enforcement of "private" bargains
and the enforcement of idealized standards of conduct grounded in domi-
nant (and hence majoritarian) social expectations. Given these political
assumptions, there was every reason to treat the state as if it were no
different than an ordinary person. The role of the state was merely to
enforce private agreements or dominant social expectations. With the
rise of the activist state, however, came a corresponding recognition by
the Court that the state could no longer be judged by these same stan-
63. See Sax, Takings II, supra note 35, at 169.
64. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 64-65 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Takings 1]; Sax, Takings II, supra note 35, at 169-71.
65. See Sax, Takings I, supra note 64, at 62-76.
66. See id.
67. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128, 135 (1978); see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-80 (1979) (implicit recognition of "enterprise"
nature of governmental action).
68. This seems to be explicitly recognized, for example, in Brennan's opinion in Penn Central.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
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dards in its own transactions with citizens; such standards were only ap-
plicable when the state was required to mediate disputes between
citizens. Therefore, additional checks on the potential abuse of rights by
the state for its own gain were needed. Accordingly, the bureaucratic
aggrandizement cause of action distinguishes between actions which the
government takes in an arbiter capacity (i.e., merely as a neutral umpire
between two private claims) and those which it takes in an enterprise
capacity (i.e., those instances where the agency has a particular goal to
fulfill and, accordingly, has an incentive not to pay compensation for any
private property that it may need to appropriate to meet its goal).
Type IV takings clause problems represent one of the many in-
stances in the modern era in which the Supreme Court has responded to
the modern change in the nature of the state. Rather than merely treat-
ing self-interested actions by the state by the same standard that would
apply to a private person (and hence, by implication, insisting that the
state has no more power over the lives of citizens than anyone else), the
Court has consistently applied a stricter standard to state action taken in
an enterprise capacity, whether in the area of economic regulation 69 or in
the realm of individual conduct.
70
Together, these four causes of action provide the implicit constructs
for conventional legal analysis of takings issues. These categories, how-
ever, also carry with them a particular intellectual structure that helps to
ask certain questions, but to ignore others. In particular, these causes of
action fail to deal well with the concerns of environmental and historic
preservation. The next Section, therefore, will consider why the applica-
tion of conventional takings categories is particularly problematic when
applied to environmental and historic preservation.
II. INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL CULTURE-A
SHORT STUDY IN THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
CONVENTIONAL LEGAL CATEGORIES
The jurisprudence of the takings clause, it is now common to ac-
knowledge, is in a state of disarray.7 It is also common to acknowledge
69. See, eg., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13
& n.14 (1983) (higher standard of review for state regulation of public contracts than for private
contracts).
70. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (disputes with state bureaucracy subject to
greater court review than analogous disputes with other citizens).
71. See, e.g., Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. 561 (1984).
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that the current state of the law reflects a legal culture in transition. 2
Takings law has always presented "hard" questions, but in the current
scheme of things many of these questions seem "particularly hard." Part
of the reason for this state of affairs is that there are two similar, yet
fundamentally distinct, issues behind some of the disorder in the takings
clause, particularly when applied to environmental and cultural preserva-
tion. The first deals with the inability of conventional legal categories to
reflect the emergence of certain intragenerational aspects of environmen-
tal and cultural preservation. The second is the inability of those same
categories to reflect the intergenerational concerns present in these two
areas. The legal culture has begun to address the first set of questions,
but it has not done well with the second. Efforts are being made to add
the new intragenerational concerns into legal dialogue, yet not enough
has been done to add the equally important intergenerational concerns.73
Consequently, part of the tension in contemporary takings clause juris-
prudence can be attributed to a legal culture that has not yet assimilated
intergenerational concerns into its categories in any significant way.
To illustrate the nature of this dilemma, the first part of this Section
considers the intragenerational and intergenerational problems associ-
ated with environmental preservation and the takings clause. Two sepa-
rate issues-intragenerational market failures and intergenerational
market failures-are considered in light of the ability of conventional
legal categories to accommodate each set of problems. To further illus-
trate the nature of this dilemma and the continued fixation of the legal
culture with categories grounded in intragenerational justice, the second
part of this Section considers the legal categories used in two significant
land use cases, Just v. Marinette County, a state court decision on wet-
lands preservation, and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of historic
landmark preservation.
A. The Conventional Doctrine and Market Failure74
As an example of the problems that conventional legal categories
72. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 89, 168-89; see also Ackerman, Four Questions
for Legal Theory, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 351 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980).
73. One of the few exceptions is Heller, The Importance ofNormative Decision-Making: The
Limitations ofLegal Economics as a Basisfor a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regula-
tion of Vacation Home Development, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 385, 406-07, 459-64.
74. For a general discussion of "market failure," see E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER
FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 291-308 (1978); Bator, The Anatomy ofMarket Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351
(1953).
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create when applied to such areas as environmental and cultural preser-
vation, assume that a state, in an effort to slow the destruction of red-
woods located on private property, prohibits the cutting of the trees.
Such a proposal would be perceived as a "hard" case under the takings
clause by conventional standards. Each of the four existing takings
causes of action would be problematic when applied to the example of
the preservation of the redwoods. Under the Type I or "Taking My
Thing" analysis, it is difficult to argue that a cause of action exists be-
cause there has not been an alteration of the land. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to argue either that a thing has been transferred to someone else,
since no tangible item has been transferred, or that an existing thing has
somehow been rendered useless or invaded, since the owner of the land
can continue to do anything he was previously able to do to the land and
need not share his existing access to the land.
Under the Type II or "Noxious Use" cause of action, it is difficult to
argue that the restriction was triggered by a noxious use. The existing
uses of the property did not produce any existing conflicts with other
landowners and, if anything, were compatible with the uses of surround-
ing areas.
The classical zoning paradigm of Type III is also inapplicable be-
cause the preservation does not produce a reciprocity of advantage. The
reciprocity of advantage argument necessarily assumes that the property
owner's "loss" is offset by the benefits gained by restrictions on nearby
property, a factor not present here. Similarly, while the equal protection
component of the classical zoning paradigm might also seem to raise a
problem, since the landowner in some sense could be considered singled
out for special treatment, that, too, would seem to be inapplicable. It is
difficult to argue either that another property owner has been helped by
the condemnation (i.e., the bribery motive) or that the property owner
affected by the condemnation has been injured (i.e., the discrimination
motive).
The fourth cause of action, "Bureaucratic Aggrandizement," may
also seem to be applicable. The government in this case appears to be
acting out of some kind of ulterior motive, and thus it could be argued
that compensation is required to check government aggrandizement.
While initially appealing, this argument, too, is flawed. In this case, it
could be argued, the state is actually acting in an arbiter rather than in an
enterprise capacity. Instead of arguing that the state is acting out of self-
ish motives, it could be argued that the state is merely serving as an arbi-
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ter or broker between citizens who are in dispersed locations or in
different generations.
The reason that the redwoods example is a difficult one for present-
day lawyers is that it places traditional concepts of private property and
takings in conflict with two different economic and social concepts asso-
ciated with environmental and historic preservation: intragenerational
market failures and intergenerational market failures. Each will be con-
sidered in turn.
1. Intragenerational Market Failures and Conventional Doctrine
Under conventional private property concepts, the owner of the
land would be free to cut down the redwoods.75 Under conventional
market assumptions there would likely be every incentive for the owner
to do this to maximize his investment in the land. Use of the land would
be determined almost entirely by the property owner. The "property," in
turn, would be defined by the physical boundaries of the land, and the
owner would be free to determine the use of the land. Any dispute about
the use of the land would be localized; only the direct physical effects of
the activity on neighboring land would be assumed to be relevant, and
the decision on how to use the land would be left solely within the prop-
erty owner's discretion.
Under conventional economic and legal assumptions, such a legal
framework of rights, when joined with free market trading, would be
assumed to reflect the proper societal ordering of uses. But once this
framework is used to assess a multiplicity of environmental concerns,
however, it can be expected to generate a series of problems.
One source of problems is that the "psychic" value of the redwoods
may well extend beyond the physical boundaries of the property itself.76
For example, even though people may not have any immediate plans to
visit the redwoods, they may derive enjoyment merely from the knowl-
edge that such redwoods exist and that if the trees are preserved, they in
effect retain an "option" to visit them in the future. Similarly, people
75. See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 30, at 328-33; see also Sax, Takings II, supra note 35, at
151-55. But see State v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (upholding statute requiring com-
mercial logging operations to leave certain number of trees standing), afl'dper curiam, 338 U.S. 863
(1949).
76. See, e.g., Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judi-
cial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV.
713, 747 (1977) ("[A] considerable portion of the benefits from pristine environments consists of the
'long distance' ideological satisfaction afforded nonresidents concerned with the preservation of ex-
traordinary environments such as the Grand Canyon or the Alaska wilderness.").
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may derive some benefit merely from the "existence" value of such trees,
even though they may never plan to visit them. In terms of conventional
market analysis, however, this separation of economic benefit from the
immediate physical location of the land itself creates several problems.
One problem is that because people may derive a benefit from the red-
woods without having to set foot on the land itself, the economic value of
these psychic benefits cannot be captured by the property owner, and
thus the value of these benefits will not be reflected in the market value of
the land. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the conventional market system
may systematically underestimate any such dispersed psychic value vis-a'-
vis the immediate development value of the land.77
A second and related problem is the presence of transaction cost and
"free rider" problems.78 Even though the economic benefit derived from
the preservation of the redwoods may be greater than the development
value of the property, an actual bargain between the property owner and
those willing to pay for the preservation is unlikely simply because such a
large and dispersed group of persons face virtually insurmountable nego-
tiation problems. If negotiations were possible, each person in the group
would likely "hold out" and wait for someone else to absorb the costs of
negotiation. As a result, the conventional market system tends to sys-
tematically underestimate the preservation value of natural resources.
This aspect of environmental preservation, in essence, is one of in-
tragenerational concern. The problem is the inability of the market to
register the desires of the present generation. In response to such
problems, recent economic analysis has responded either by redoing the
economic notion of "externality," 7 9 by using transaction cost economics
to justify governmental intervention, 0 or by attempting to place an exist-
ence or an option value on preservation. 1 In a similar fashion, legal
77. See, e.g., Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481,
485-86 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Decline of Private Property].
78. See, eg., W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 10-11; R.
STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, MATERIALS AND NOTES
107-08 (2d ed. 1978); Michelman, supra note 47, at 1174-76. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
79. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also Mishan, The
Post- War Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. I (1971).
80. See, eg., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 398-400 (1981).
81. See, eg., Arrow & Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88
Q.J. ECON. 312 (1974); Cicchetti & Freeman, Option Demand and Consumer Surplus: Further Com-
ment, 85 Q.J. ECON. 528 (1971); see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177-79 (1978) (option value on
preservation of endangered species). See generally Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1967).
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scholarship has responded by proposing new legal concepts aimed at con-
fronting such concerns. The most innovative legal argument, set forth by
Joseph Sax, has been to redefine the notions of property and takings to
reflect these intragenerational market failures. This argument has taken
two forms. The first response is to argue that the notion of private prop-
erty should be redefined to acknowledge the shift from an individualistic,
localized concept of property that stressed individual autonomy to one
that stresses the interrelated nature of land use and the resulting "public"
nature of the concern over land use. 2 Sax, in essence, responds to the
intragenerational market failure created as a result of the diffused,
"psychic" nature of the benefits from the environmental preservation by
treating these benefits as a single public or common right. By recogniz-
ing a common right, a type of meta-class action is created which over-
comes the free rider and negotiation problems that otherwise would have
hindered the advocates of preservation.
The second and related response has been to redefine the takings
problem in such a way that the preservation of these public rights is not
deemed to be a taking even though it may result in a severe restriction on
the present development of property.8 3 The approach Sax takes here par-
allels his treatment of property rights. Under conventional takings doc-
trine, preservation of the environmental value of the land that severely
diminished the value of the property might be treated as a taking since
the analysis would be limited to its impact on the landowner. In con-
trast, under Sax's formulation, the same action would be analyzed as a
conflict between two different interests (i.e., those of the property owner
and those of the holders of public rights).8 4 Each set of rights, therefore,
would be considered on an equal footing. If the actions of the property
owner had significant spillover effects, the dispute would be resolved in
favor of the holders of the public right and, thus, not be considered a
taking "however severe the economic loss on the property owner."8"
This analysis of takings, of course, presupposes Sax's theory of prop-
erty rights. It is only when public rights are recognized that the focus of
the legal analysis can be expanded beyond the property of the landowner
82. Sax, Decline of Private Property, supra note 77 (transformation of nature of private property
to recognize public rights); Sax, Takings II, supra note 35, at 161-72 (same); Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970)
(development of "public trust" doctrine to the effect that environmental resources are impressed
with a trust for the benefit of the public which governs disposition and use of such areas).
83. Sax, Takings II, supra note 35; Sax, Takings , supra note 64.
84. Sax, Takings II, supra note 35.
85. Id. at 162.
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and its immediate physical surroundings. Thus, both Sax's reconstruc-
tion of property rights and his reconstruction of takings doctrine are re-
lated. Moreover, both are efforts to respond to the same basic problem of
intragenerational market failures.
2. Justice Between Generations and Conventional Doctrine
Without denying the validity of Sax's approach, it must be recog-
nized that intragenerational market failures are only part of the problem.
Indeed, this approach fails to address the related, yet fundamentally dif-
ferent, problems of intergenerational market failures and justice between
generations. Although part of the rationale for the preservation of the
redwoods may be linked to the inability of conventional notions of pri-
vate property and the market to register the desires of the present genera-
tion, an equally important justification is the preservation of the
redwoods for future generations. In this sense, the preservation of the
redwoods for purposes of justice between generations-what could be
termed "intergenerational condemnation"-differs fundamentally from
each of the existing four takings causes of action, each of which serves as
an example of "intragenerational condemnation."
Intergenerational condemnation, unlike the conventional in-
tragenerational condemnation, is not a contest between a present land-
owner and present government. Instead, it is a contest between present
landowners and the next generation as represented by the present gov-
ernment. The present government takes part of a bundle of property
rights from the present generation and gives it to the next generation.
The purpose of redistributing the property rights is to give a voice to the
next generation, who, because they are not yet in existence, would not
otherwise be able to bid on the saving of such lands in the marketplace.
The inability of conventional doctrine to accommodate justice be-
tween generations is not accidental. The simple reason for this short-
coming is that conventional takings doctrine is grounded in an
intragenerational concept of land use. In particular, three fundamental
assumptions about land use are implicit in all four of the conventional
causes of action for takings. First, all four focus exclusively on in-
tragenerational resources conflicts. The temporal framework of each is
limited to conflicts between members of the present generation over ex-
isting property. In each case, the government has either tried to transfer
property to another member of the present generation or restrict the
present use of property. Second and perhaps most significantly, the rele-
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vant economic effects of each cause of action are considered solely in
terms of the present generation. Compensation is judged by the current
market value and is paid by members of the present generation (through
their government) to other members of the present generation. Similarly,
any effects of noncompensated takings are also limited to the present gen-
eration. Third and closely related, the standard of just compensation is
based on the assumptions of a working market and existing bidders. The
fair market value standard for just compensation necessarily assumes
that the worth of the land is to be measured by its value to the present
generation.
While takings clause jurisprudence remains grounded in intragener-
ational resources conflicts, land use as a whole has increasingly begun to
take the form of a question of intergenerational justice. For most of this
country's past, the use of a purely intragenerational focus did not raise
any significant problem. In an era of growth, a commitment to the devel-
opment of land benefited both present and future generations. So long as
an expansionist ethic prevailed, along with a cheap and abundant supply
of land, the interests of the present generation and the next generation
were substantially identical. Present growth served the needs of the next
generation as well. What allowed the present generation to grow also
allowed the next generation to grow. The interests of the next generation
were thus cared for by the same means that cared for the present genera-
tion-the market. Under these assumptions, the needs of the two genera-
tions did not diverge and the market became the predominant means of
achieving the perceived public goals. Under such circumstances, an in-
tragenerational perspective on the takings clause remained un-
problematic. The relevant legal categories, with their implicit
assumptions about present market value and intragenerational resource
conflict would, by coincidence, also serve the needs of the next genera-
tion. By promoting growth and umpiring the conflicts of the present
generation, the takings clause doctrine would also protect the next
generation.
With the coming of greater land scarcity and the rise of the conser-
vation ethic, the interests of the present and next generation began to
diverge and the market paradigm for land use became increasingly prob-
lematic. 6 Growth in the form of development of land by the present
generation no longer necessarily served the goals of the next generation.
86. See, e.g., Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981)
(general discussion of relationship between economics and environmental values).
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As planning and conservation became prominent features of land use, the
focus shifted away from merely present concerns to both present and
future concerns. And as future concerns diverged from present concerns,
the market test became less relevant and "market failure"-the inability
of the market to translate relevant preferences into collective decisions-
became a more frequent problem. If the desires of future generations
were relevant but did not happen to match those of the present genera-
tion, the market could not respond. The present preferences registered in
the market thus did not correspond to the preferences of the relevant
group.
As a result of the conflict between the intragenerational perspective
assumed within the conventional takings causes of action and the in-
tergenerational concerns about preservation, each of the four existing
causes of action is unable to accommodate the relevant concerns of jus-
tice between generations. The same features of conventional notions of
private property that make it difficult to accommodate problems of in-
tragenerational market failures also make it difficult to accommodate in-
tergenerational market failures. For example, conventional legal
categories implicitly assume that property is a physical thing defined by
physical boundaries in which the owner exercises considerable auton-
omy. This reification and resulting localization of property screens out
dispersed, nonphysical concerns (such as the psychic value of preserva-
tion) and thus fails to create the physical harm to adjoining property
redressed by the nuisance cause of action. At the same time, however,
these same features screen out intergenerational concerns. The reifica-
tion of property associated with conventional notions of private property
is time-bound. The property and the relevant acts of autonomy or injury
associated with it are confined to three dimensions. As a result, a split of
control between generations or an act that only becomes harmful in the
context of more than one generation is also outside the scope of the con-
ventional framework. The intragenerational perspective of conventional
takings clause doctrine also assumes that the preservation of land will be
considered from the viewpoint of a contest between members of the pres-
ent generation.
The presence of both intragenerational market failures and in-
tergenerational market failures thus combine to create most of the "par-
ticularly hard" questions for the treatment of preservation issues under
the conventional legal categories. Ultimately, an adequate modern the-
ory of takings will have to deal with both. To the extent that the legal
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culture continues to rely upon the conventional takings causes of action,
however, the analysis of preservation issues will continue to be
problematic.
B. Conventional Categories and the Legal Culture
In order to illustrate the significance of this problem for the present
legal culture, the remainder of this Section will consider two landmark
takings cases in the environmental and land use area-Just v. Marinette
County, which deals with the preservation of wetlands, and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, which deals with the preservation
of historic landmarks. Not surprisingly, both cases are influenced by
concerns of intragenerational market failures. Yet each case also deals
with concerns of justice between generations. In the instance of wetlands
preservation, the state is attempting, in part, to compensate for the in-
ability of the present market to register current demand for preservation
and, in part, to save the land in its natural state for use by future genera-
tions. Similarly, in the instance of historic preservation, the state is at-
tempting to preserve a cultural landmark, in part, for the benefit of future
(as well as past) generations. Inasmuch as the categories used in each
opinion to structure the legal analysis constitute reformulated versions of
one of the four conventional causes of action under the takings clause,
the legal analysis in each case remains somewhat controversial. In each
case, it is not so much that the final result reached is necessarily unjusti-
fied. Rather, the problem with each case is that the result that was
reached was justified solely by reliance on conventional categories,
which, in turn, are grounded in notions of intragenerational justice.
Thus, most of the legal dialogue was not focused on the legitimate issue
of justice between generations. In neither instance, however, could the
conventional categories accommodate all of the relevant concerns.
Therefore, the lingering uneasiness about each case is not so much a mat-
ter of unease about the politics of the end result but, more meaningfully,
the inability of conventional legal categories (however much reformu-
lated) to direct attention to all of the relevant substantive issues raised by
such cases.
1. Just v. Marinette County8 7
In Just, the property owners purchased lakeshore land expecting to
develop and then sell it. After they bought the property, however, the
87. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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state passed shoreland zoning legislation that severely limited the devel-
opment that could take place on the land and, in essence, required that
the land be preserved in its present natural and undeveloped state." The
property owners argued that the legislation constituted a taking of their
property.
In upholding the preservation scheme, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in what has become a landmark opinion, justified the zoning on
two general grounds. First, the court, in what was essentially a modified
Type II or noxious use cause of action, drew upon the statement of a
Lochner era treatise that government action would be upheld if the prop-
erty was taken because it "harmed" the public but would be deemed a
taking if, instead, it was taken for the "benefit" of the public.8 9 Based
upon this "harm/benefit" theory, the court argued that requiring that
the natural status quo of the environment be maintained constituted the
prevention of harm rather than the securing of a benefit for the public
and, therefore, concluded that the legislation "[does] not create or im-
prove the public condition but only preserves nature from the despoilage
and harm resulting from the unrestricted activities of humans." 90 Sec-
ond, the court stressed the "public trust" nature of the action by the
state, thus implying that it was recognizing the existence of public
rights. 91
While hailed by environmentalists as a landmark decision, the
court's rationale has remained controversial. In particular, the use of the
"harm/benefit" theory has been criticized 92 and has raised a number of
problems. 93 The most important point is that any extensive use of such a
88. In Just, the county adopted a shoreland zoning ordinance to comply with a state shoreland
zoning statute. The ordinance classified the shoreland area into three districts, including a "conser-
vancy district" covering wetlands. Only natural uses were permitted in the conservancy district,
such as hunting, fishing, hiking, and harvesting of wild crops. Id. at 11-12 & n.3, 201 N.W.2d at 765
& n.3. Conditional permits were permitted for such actions as dredge and fill. Id. at 12 & n.4, 201
N.W.2d at 765 & n.4. The property owners, however, did not apply for a permit. Id. at 14, 201
N.W.2d at 766. Instead, they challenged the creation of the conservancy district as a violation of the
takings clause. Id at 14, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
89. See id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767 (quoting E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 546-47). The rele-
vant language from the Freund treatise is the following:
[I]t may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to
the public, and under the police power because it is harmful....
From this results the difference between the power of eminent domain and the police
power, that the former recognises a right to compensation, while the latter on principle
does not.
Id.
90. 56 Wis. 2d at 25, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
91. See id. at 16-19, 201 N.W.2d at 768-69.
92. See, eg., D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW 328-29 (1982).
93. See, eg., id. at 18-20; Michelman, supra note 47, at 1196-1201.
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theory is bound to be incomplete for the simple reason that a Type II
analysis was meant to deal only with intragenerational problems and was
developed as a complement to conventional notions of private property.
Given the need to justify what on an intuitive basis must have seemed
like a proper decision, the court cannot be faulted for merely attempting
to modify existing standards to justify the decision. On a long-term ba-
sis, however, such a rationale is problematic because it fails to analyze
the problem as one of justice between generations.
In this respect, the Just decision serves as a prominent example of
the cultural aspects of legal categories. The wetlands issue, in part, is
about such problems as the inability of the conventional notions of the
market and of private property to respond to the environmental values
held by those in the present generation. This issue is also, in part, a
matter of justice between generations. The reason why the development
of wetlands is being restricted (which the court itself seemed to acknowl-
edge94) is so that the land in its natural state will be preserved for use by
the next generation of citizens.
Nonetheless, because the dominant categories in the legal culture
are grounded in intragenerational justice and because the developing cat-
egories (such as public trust) deal predominantly with intragenerational
market failures, the continued use of the modified Type II "benefit/
harm" theory is likely to be problematic. The issue is not truly centered
on whether there is a benefit and a harm within one generation, but
whether there is a benefit or harm between several generations. By
merely categorizing the action as a prevention of "harm," the court nec-
essarily conflated the two issues and thus was unable to generate an en-
tirely satisfactory rationale for its decision.
2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City95
In Penn Central, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether a New York plan for the preservation of historic structures vio-
lated the takings clause. Under the New York City law, no exterior
changes could be made on a landmark without the prior approval of the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission. After Grand
Central Terminal had been designated as a landmark, Penn Central, the
owner of the terminal, applied for permission to build a fifty-five-story
94. See 56 Wis. 2d at 23-24 & n.6, 201 N.W.2d at 771 & n.6.
95. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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office building over the terminal. The permit was denied. 96 Penn Central
then challenged the Landmarks Preservation Law, arguing that its prop-
erty had been taken without just compensation.
In upholding the validity of the historic preservation scheme, the
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, relied on conventional
legal categories.97 While several different takings causes of action were
argued, the critical portion of the opinion centered on a Type III or class-
ical zoning paradigm and its associated concept of "average reciprocity
of advantage."98 As discussed previously, a key concept in the classical
zoning paradigm is the assumption that the benefits and burdens of the
program are more or less evenly distributed over the affected property
owners.9 9 Thus, even though a property owner may be "harmed" in the
sense that the zoning reduced the immediate economic value of the land
(for example, because of restricting the use of the land to residential
rather than industrial use), the same property owner is also "benefited"
in the sense that zoning restrictions on other property in the zoning plan
ultimately redound to his benefit. Consequently, zoning and its arrange-
ment of benefits and burdens supposedly represents a series of pareto su-
perior moves brokered by the state. In addition, the notion of a benefit
offsetting harm also serves as a variety of compensation in kind.
Given this rationale for classical zoning, the New York preservation
scheme presented a dilemma for the Court. Unlike a conventional zon-
ing scheme that designated general uses over entire geographic areas, the
New York scheme designated individual landmarks.100 As a result, the
classical notion of average reciprocity of advantage was missing; the re-
striction on the property designated as an historic landmark benefited
surrounding property owners as well as the public at large, but there was
no countervailing restriction on any other property in the immediate area
to offset the diminution of the value of the designated property.
The reason why no average reciprocity of advantage existed was be-
cause, in part, the preservation of Grand Central Station ultimately
presented a matter of intergenerational condemnation. The preservation
of the property represented, in part, a bargain struck by the present gov-
ernment between a property owner in the present generation and mem-
96. The Landmark Law, however, provided that if the full development of the designated site
was thus prohibited, the property owner was entitled to transfer development rights (TDRs) to con-
tiguous parcels on the same city block. See id. at 114-15.
97. See supra note 43.
98. 438 U.S. at 133-35.
99. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
100. See 438 U.S. at 107, 109-11, 133.
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bers of the next generation. Under such circumstances, any conventional
notion of reciprocity of advantage was lacking because the harm and the
benefit were in two different generations. Because Brennan continued to
analyze the landmark preservation law solely in terms of the conven-
tional causes of action, he was presented with a significant conceptual
problem. On the one hand, if he relied entirely on the conventional ap-
plication of the existing takings categories, he would be hard pressed to
justify the restriction on the use of the land, since none of those catego-
ries was designed to deal with justice between generations. On the other
hand, he could pretend that the conventional categories covered in-
tergenerational condemnation. This would make it easier to uphold the
landmark preservation law, but at the expense of depriving the categories
of their normal meaning and dealing openly with the concerns of justice
between generations.
Brennan ultimately chose to reconstruct the conventional categories
by using two different techniques. First, he redefined the nature of aver-
age reciprocity of advantage. Despite Penn Central's claim that it had
been singled out for harm and that it did not in fact receive any counter-
vailing benefits because of the designation of the property as an historic
landmark, Brennan declared that such a claim was "factually inaccu-
rate." 10 1 The Court, Brennan continued, could not "conclude that the
owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the
Landmarks Law" since the "preservation of landmarks benefits all New
York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the
quality of life in the city as a whole."10 2 As evidenced by Justice Rehn-
quist's dissenting opinion, Brennan's argument is, of course, problematic
at best from the perspective of the conventional categories. ° 3 Except in
the most general sense, there was no offsetting benefit from the other
nearby property for the owner of the property selected for preservation.
Thus, Brennan's reliance on some conventional notion of reciprocity of
advantage can only be described as marginal.
Second, Brennan also tried to disguise the landmark designation as
merely a Type II or noxious use cause of action. Historic preservation,
however, cannot be classified as a conventional Type II noxious use case.
The designation of Grand Central Terminal as a landmark without pay-
ment of compensation could not be justified on the basis of either physi-
101. See id. at 134-35.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 147-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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cal harm to surrounding property or violation of accepted standards of
neighborliness. In fact, if anything, the preservation benefited surround-
ing property owners. The "act" of historic preservation thus did not fit
into the classical concept of nuisance."° Far from being the classic "pig
in the parlor,"' 5 the case did not deal with pigs at all, but rather with
the preservation of the parlor itself. When faced with this possibility,
Justice Brennan responded by pretending that the noxious use cases in
fact stood for something else and that something else was what was in-
volved in the present case. Specifically, Brennan denied that the noxious
use cases had ever really been noxious use cases at all.10 6 Instead, he
argued, they merely represented "the implementation of a policy-not
unlike historic preservation-expected to produce a widespread public
benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property."' 1 7 This, of
course, was a classic example of a bootstrap argument. Instead of rede-
fining the problem to fit the category (as he had with the zoning para-
digm), Brennan redefined the category to fit the problem.
The real problem in Penn Central was not so much the decision's
result, but the legal categories used to arrive at that result. Penn Central
really had nothing to do with classical zoning or nuisance; instead, the
case displayed a continued reliance by the Court on legal categories
which were ultimately grounded in the resolution of intragenerational
resource conflicts to deal with intergenerational condemnation. Historic
preservation, like wetlands preservation, also involves both intragenera-
tional and intergenerational market failures.0 8 Once again, the market
is likely to fail to register all of the intragenerational concerns about the
psychic desires of large numbers of persons. Most important, it also in-
volves significant intergenerational concerns. In the case of historic pres-
ervation, the future generation is seeking to have significant cultural
items preserved for itself, and the present generation (as well as the past)
104. See id. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.").
106. See 438 U.S. at 133 & n.30.
107. Id. at 134 n.30.
108. While certainly similar from the general perspective of intergenerational condemnation,
wetlands preservation and historic preservation still have some important differences. First, the
preservation of the natural environment merely requires the cessation of a noncompatible activity,
while the preservation of historic structures requires that action be taken (i.e., repairs) to maintain
the status quo. Second, environmental preservation is typically for the benefit of present and future
generations, while historic preservation is, in part, for the benefit of past generations as well. Third,
because historic preservation typically takes place in an urban setting (and can also involve isolated
landmarks), compensation schemes (such as TDRs) based on the development of adjacent property
would be difficult to implement in the context of environmental preservation.
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is attempting to pass on some of its important statements of culture. By
relying on conventional categories, however, the Court failed to make
this distinction and, as a result, its rationale remains troublesome.
3. The Continued Influence of Conventional Categories
Together, Just and Penn Central illustrate an important dilemma in
current takings clause jurisprudence, particularly as it is applied to envi-
ronmental and cultural preservation. Part of the perceived increase in
the need for environmental and historic preservation is the inability of
conventional legal and economic categories to deal with concerns of jus-
tice between generations. At the same time, however, the legal culture
continues to analyze such problems solely in terms of conventional
causes of action. To some extent, this is understandable. If new
problems can be made to look like old problems, any judge that recog-
nizes them and any lawyer that argues for them runs less of a risk of
being perceived by his or her peers as being deviant or by the public as
disregarding the (supposed) rule of law. At some point, however, it is
important to recognize that the conventional categories necessarily carry
with them a certain intellectual structure. The conventional categories
can only be pushed so far before they no longer make sense. A legal
culture that continues to rely upon the conventional causes of action be-
cause of their familiar appeal can therefore be expected to generate less
than satisfactory analyses when confronted with factual situations laden
with intergenerational concerns. Thus, while the end result in a given
case may be politically satisfying, there is a sense that the legal doctrine
supporting that result does not fit together as well as it should.
If takings clause jurisprudence and the legal culture are to respond
to these emerging concerns of justice between generations, a fifth takings
clause cause of action must be added-that of "intergenerational con-
demnation." If the legal culture is to begin to deal with the problems of
intergenerational justice, it must recognize the limits of its existing cate-
gories and begin to talk about alternatives. Consideration must go be-
yond conventional legal categories. Harder issues of intergenerational
justice must be considered. First, to what extent can the present govern-
ment take bundles of rights from present landowners for the purpose of
giving them to the next generation? Second, when, if ever, must the pres-
ent landowners be compensated? Third, if the landowner is to be com-
pensated, how much should it be? Finally, if the landowner is to be
compensated, who is to do it, the present generation or the next? The
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next section of this Article, therefore, presents a modest proposal for a
utilitarian model of intergenerational condemnation.
III. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE-A UTILITARIAN PROPOSAL
FOR INTERGENERATIONAL CONDEMNATION
Recent legal scholarship has generated several models based in
political philosophy that could be adapted to intergenerational condem-
nation. This Section will therefore analyze intergenerational condemna-
tion in light of recent scholarly treatment of the takings clause.
A. Political Philosophy and the Takings Clause
The leading scholarly work on the takings clause in the last several
decades has been done by Joseph Sax,' 09 Frank Michelman, III and Bruce
Ackerman. 1' While their work considered only intragenerational con-
demnation-and thus would not be directly applicable to intergenera-
tional condemnation-their basic approach is promising. The work of
Michelman and Ackerman is of particular importance because each au-
thor shows the usefulness of analyzing the takings clause from the view-
point of political philosophy." 2 A brief discussion of their ideas about
intragenerational condemnation may serve as a useful preface to a similar
analysis of intergenerational condemnation.
The takings problem arises because of a shift in entitlements by the
state. Some citizens lose bundles of rights, others gain. A loser claims
the shift is unjust unless he is paid. Instead of analyzing the loser's claim
in traditional terms, such as physical invasion or noxious use,, 13 Acker-
man and Michelman develop a utilitarian ("efficiency")' analysis.
109. Sax, Takings I1 supra note 35; Sax, Takings I supra note 64.
110. Michelman, supra note 47.
111. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44. Other significant works in the area include Baxter & Altree,
Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1972); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer:
An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective:
30 Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Plater, The Takings Issue in
a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEX. L. REV. 201 (1974); Williamson, Admin-
istrative Decisionmaking and Pricing: Externality and Compensation Analysis Applied, in THE
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTPUT 115 (J. Margolis ed. 1970).
112. Most recently, this approach is discussed in Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 1427, 1462-1501 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
113. See, eg., id. at 1466-82. A good summary can also be found in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 9-1 to -4 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
114. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 44-49; Michelman, supra note 47, at 1208-13; Develop.
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Under the utilitarian analysis, the issue is whether overall social utility is
maximized by granting or denying the claim.115 The calculation is based
on three factors:' 16
1. Net Efficiency Gains.
A net efficiency gain occurs when the benefits (B) from a project
exceed all project costs (C) other than demoralization costs and settle-
ment costs. Such costs typically flow from the project itself.
2. Demoralization Costs (D).
These costs consist of the dollars necessary to offset (a) the disutility
caused to the landowner if compensation is not paid, (b) the disutility
caused to other landowners because they are made more insecure by the
prospect that the same thing might happen to them, and (c) the disutility
caused by any future production lost because of (a) or (b).
3. Settlement Costs (S).
This category of costs takes into account the time, effort, and re-
sources needed to process and pay compensation claims.
Assuming that the project itself would not be undertaken unless the
net efficiency gains are greater than either the demoralization costs or the
settlement costs (i.e., [B-C]-D > 0 or [B-C]-S > 0), the additional decision
to award or deny compensation is the result of a simple calculation.
Under the utilitarian model, the state would pay compensation whenever
the social cost of providing compensation is less than the social cost of
allowing individuals to remain uncompensated. In effect, the state
chooses the lesser of two evils, demoralization costs or settlement costs.
If demoralization costs are greater than settlement costs (D > S), com-
pensation is given. On the other hand, if demoralization costs are less
than settlement costs (D<S), compensation is denied.' 7
ments, supra note 112, at 1483-91. This model is further developed in Note, Uncertainty over Ad-
verse Government Action and the Law of Just Compensation, 90 YALE L.J. 1670 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Uncertainty]. A Kantian or "fairness" analysis has also been developed. See B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 44, at 71-76; Michelman, supra note 47, at 1214-24; Developments, supra note 112,
at 1491-97; see also Note, Utility, Fairness and the Takings Clause: Three Perspectives on Laird v.
Nelms, 59 VA. L. REv. 1034, 1058-68 (1973). This approach will not be discussed here, however.
115. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 44-49; Michelman, supra note 47, at 1208-13; Develop-
ments, supra note 112, at 1483.
116. Developments, supra note 112, at 1483; see Michelman, supra note 47, at 1214-15. A
slightly different formula is used in B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 44-49.
117. Ackerman's additional contribution was to link political philosophy to the way a judge
understands his role in the legal system. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 31-39, 49-63, 77-83. The
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B. A Utilitarian Model of Intergenerational Condemnation
Neither Michelman nor Ackerman deal with intergenerational jus-
tice; however, their work might be adapted to apply to intergenerational
condemnation. This Section will develop a model for intergenerational
condemnation based on a modified version of utilitarianism. Although
the basic utilitarian format will be used, it will be tempered somewhat by
several of the justice between generations arguments proposed in John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice.
1. A Model for Intergenerational Condemnation
The utilitarian model for intragenerational condemnation provides a
useful starting point for a model for intergenerational condemnation.
The same factors can be considered: net efficiency gains, demoralization
costs, and settlement costs. The application of these factors in the con-
text of justice between generations, however, raises two additional con-
siderations. First, a different group of persons with different interests
must be placed in the balance. Calculations of utility for intragenera-
tional condemnation can be made for a single point in time for a single
group. But in intergenerational condemnation, calculations must be
made for two different groups at two different times. The interests of the
present generation must be considered from the point of view of the pres-
ent generation, while the interests of the next generation must be consid-
ered from the point of view of the next generation. Second, there is an
obvious time gap between the two generations. This time gap brings up
two problems: discounting (i.e., how much weight should be given by
the present generation to the future desires and needs of the next genera-
tion) and projections of future land use (i.e., what the desires of the next
generation would be). Both of these new factors predominate in the dis-
cussion of net efficiency costs, the first component of the utilitarian
formula. In the model to be offered, the basic utilitarian elements will
also be modified by Rawls' view of justice between generations and time
preference. After net efficiency goals have been discussed, demoraliza-
starting point is the notion of a "well-ordered" society, borrowed from John Rawls. Id. at 35; see J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-5, 453-72 (1971). In such a society the basic social, legal, and
economic institutions generally perform in a manner consistent with basic accepted principles. If a
judge believes that society is presently "well-ordered," he will not want to use his power to change
the existing state of affairs. In other words, he will be restrained. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at
35-36. On the other hand, if the judge believes that some component of society is presently not
"well-ordered," he would view his power as an opportunity to correct the malfunction so that the
final result would be the same as if it originally had been the result of a well-functioning system.
Such a judge would be labeled innovative. Id. at 36.
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tion costs and settlement costs will be covered. Finally, a formula will be
offered for an assessment of intergenerational condemnation.
a. The first element: net efficiency gains
By analogy to the utilitarian model for intragenerational condemna-
tion, the net efficiency gains for intergenerational condemnation flowing
from a given preservation of land would be the excess of the total eco-
nomic benefits in both generations over the economic losses (excluding
settlement costs and demoralization costs) in both generations. 118 The
calculation of the benefits for intergenerational condemnation is both
more complex and less definite than for intragenerational condemnation,
however, because of the need to project future benefits and because of the
problems of discounting.
Projection of Future Benefits. A model for intergenerational con-
demnation must project the benefits to the next generation. Even before
discounting is confronted, the benefits expected must still be identified.
An estimate of future benefits necessarily involves prediction. Nonethe-
less, several useful guidelines would include:
(1) the types of nondestructive activities popular at some time in
the past, even though not presently pursued (this helps to preserve op-
tions and to accommodate the reemergence of past uses);
(2) the trends in land use in the present generation, such as an
increase in camping (more likely than not, the next generation will re-
semble the present generation more than a more distant generation); and
(3) the activities that have survived history (if the activities have
gone on for several hundred years or more, it is likely that they will be
continued in the future).
In addition to projected land use preferences, the number of people
involved and their location would also be considered. Thus, projections
of population growth and concentration would also be important. The
use of such criteria would undoubtedly generate a certain amount of
good faith disagreement over projections. Some choices, however, would
be easy to make. For example, while the preservation of land for sport
hunting would be perceived as controversial, since opinion is changing on
118. Only the calculation of benefits are specifically discussed here in the text. Costs, of course,
will also have to be considered; however, in the typical intergenerational condemnation setting, the
costs are incurred for the most part by the present generation. Thus, the calculation of costs typi-
cally does not present the special intergenerational problems associated with the calculation of bene-
fits discussed in the text.
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the matter, the preservation of land for hiking or wilderness preservation
would probably not present a difficult issue.
Discounting: The Need for a Rawlsian Constraint on Time Prefer-
ence. After a projection of the benefits for the next generation has been
made, a second aspect of intergenerational justice remains. Specifically,
the benefits calculated for the two generations are still separated by time;
some benefits are in the year 1986, others are in the year 2016. Should
the two figures simply be summed together or should the future benefits
count less? Consideration of this problem brings up the weight to be
given to the benefits of the next generation vis-A-vis the present genera-
tion. Typically, the process employed in making this determination is
expressed as discounting.
Discounting is the devaluation of the benefits which accrue to the
next generation. For example, as is done in conventional cost-benefit
analysis, I 9 if the benefits to the next generation in the year 2016 totalled
$100, but if the present value of those benefits, once they are discounted
to 1986, is $20, an argument might be made that the $20 figure rather
than the $100 figure should be used. The use of discounting, however,
would be particularly damaging to intergenerational condemnation be-
cause of the expected temporal distribution of gains and losses; that is,
benefits would be greatest in the future, while losses would be greatest in
the present. Thus, most benefits would be subject to discounting but
most losses would not, thereby skewing the balance toward the
present. 120
More significantly, perhaps, the argument against the use of dis-
counting in an intergenerational scenario can be extended beyond the
technique's mechanical bias towards the present to include, first, a practi-
cal concern about growth and the use of the market and, second, a philo-
sophical claim grounded in justice between generations. The practical
argument is that the rationale originally favoring discounting of future
benefits in the preservation of land is less applicable now than previ-
ously.'21 Discounting favors present development. In a predominately
119. See, e-g,, E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, supra note 74, at 159-76.
120. Moreover, this problem would be particularly acute when projected more than one genera-
tion into the future.
121. General support for the discussion in this paragraph may be found in Fisher, Krutilla &
Cicchetti, The Economics of Environmental Preservation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 605, 609-10 (1972). The authors argue that in a typical cost-benefit analysis, bene-
fits from development projects such as dams are overvalued while the benefits from nondevelopment
are neglected or undervalued. They argue that conventional cost-benefit analysis neglects the pos-
sibilities that technological change is likely to decrease the value of the electricity generated by the
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land-rich, agrarian, low-technology country seeking development, such
as the United States in the nineteenth century, discounting had the effect
of furthering future needs. Both the present and the next generation ben-
efited from the development of land since it represented (in that eco-
nomic structure) the predominant means of capital formation.
Given those circumstances, economic development, particularly in a
country blessed with an abundant supply of natural resources, would be
tied to the appropriation, development, and use of land. Development of
natural resources represented the surest, cheapest, and quickest way to
stimulate capital formulation. Preservation limited the capital carried
over to the next generation because it removed land from the market-
place. But once the development of land is displaced by the development
of technology as the primary means for future growth, as is the case in a
land-limited, technology-based country such as the present United
States, the discounting of future benefits from the preservation of land
can no longer be justified as a basis for total growth. Under the current
set of economic parameters, the development of technology, rather than
the development of land, must be viewed as the predominate means of
capital development and future growth. In other words, in a country
with vast land reserves and low technology, discounting of future benefits
from the preservation of land use favors the society's overall develop-
ment. But in a developed country, the same discounting of benefits from
future land use (as opposed to technology) has served its purpose. Fur-
thermore, discounting presupposes a market analysis that is capable of
asking the present generation what it would pay in the present market for
a delayed use of resources. As such, like the "fair market value" test for
compensation, discounting simply asks the wrong question. A present
market analysis cannot assess intergenerational needs and, thus, must be
subject to some of the same intergenerational market failure problems
discussed previously with respect to environmental and cultural
preservation.
In addition to this practical claim, there is a more fundamental phil-
osophical claim that one generation should not be favored over another.
A contemporary statement of this position is found in the treatment of
justice between generations in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls.122 At
dam within the life of the project and that the value society places on undeveloped areas is likely to
rise with increased affluence.
122. J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For general background and assessment of A
Theory of Justice, see B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); READING RAWLS (N.
Daniels ed. 1975); R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977).
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the core of Rawls' entire theory of justice is the belief that persons have a
certain fixed minimum amount of rights that cannot be sacrificed even if
doing so would create an overall gain to society. 123 A person may not be
treated only as a means to gain benefits for society.' 24 Similarly, one
generation is not to be preferred over another. 25
To develop this theory, Rawls refined social contract theory by
utilizing the concept of an "original position," a hypothetical situation in
which persons are to decide once and for all the fundamental principles
that should govern the major social institutions."2 6 To avoid the
problems of self-interest, Rawls' unique contribution was to place per-
sons in an "original position" behind a hypothetical "veil of ignorance"
where they do not know the abilities, wealth, or place in society they
would later inherit.127 From such a position, Rawls posits that individu-
als would choose to have a world based on the following two principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advan-
tage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.' 2"
These two principles form the basis for the organization of the major
social institutions in each generation.' 29
Rawls facilitates the development of justice between generations by
positing that, in addition to the lack of knowledge about personal skills
or wealth, the persons in the original position do not know the generation
to which they will belong.'3 ' Thus justice between generations is also
determined from the original position.' 3' The task for those in the origi-
nal position, in Rawls' words, is the following:
They try to piece together a just savings schedule by balancing how
much at each stage they would be willing to save for their immediate
descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of their im-
mediate predecessors. Thus imagining themselves to be fathers, say,
they are to ascertain how much they would set aside for their sons by
noting what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of their
fathers.... When this principle is followed, adjacent generations can-
123. J. RAwLS, supra note 122, at 3-4.
124. Id. at 179-82.
125. Id. at 293-98.
126. Id. at 17-22, 118-92.
127. Id. at 18-19, 136-42.
128. Id. at 60. For a more extended version of the two principles, see id. at 250.
129. See id. at 195-201.
130. Id. at 287.
131. See id. at 287-93.
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not complain of one another; and in fact no generation can find fault
with any other no matter how far removed in time.
132
The key feature of Rawls' position is that differences in time do not
justify treating persons differently. Because the persons in the original
position do not know the generation to which they will belong and thus
have no "time preference," one generation is not favored over another.
A proposal favoring the present would therefore be deemed arbitrary and
ethically unsound:
There is no reason for the parties to give any weight to mere position in
time. They have to choose a rate of saving for each level of civiliza-
tion. If they make a distinction between earlier and more remote peri-
ods because, say, future states of affairs seem less important now, the
present state of affairs will seem less important in the future. Although
any decision has to be made now, there is no ground for their using
today's discount of the future rather than the future's discount of to-
day. The situation is symmetrical and one choice is as arbitrary as the
other.133
On the basis of this analysis, Rawls suggests that the rejection of time
preferences could moderate the consequences of a utility criterion.
1 34
Rawls' time preference constraint is especially appealing because it rein-
forces the earlier practical argument based on theories of growth and
market failure.
b. The second element: demoralization costs
A utilitarian analysis of the demoralization costs of intragenera-
tional condemnation included the disutility flowing from three sources.
The first two sources included the disutility caused to the landowner be-
cause he is not compensated and the disutility caused to other landown-
ers, even though they are not directly affected, because they are made
more insecure by the prospect that the same thing might happen to them.
The third source of disutility included the dollars needed to offset any
future loss of production caused to either the affected landowner because
132. Id. at 289-90. Once the savings rate has been determined under this method, it will serve as
a constraint between generations in the same manner that the two principles of justice served as a
constraint between persons within a generation:
In any generation their expectations are to be maximized subject to the condition of putting
aside the savings that would be acknowledged. Thus the complete statement of the differ-
ence principle includes the savings principle as a constraint. Whereas the first principle of
justice and the principle of fair opportunity limit the application of the difference principle
within generations, the savings principle limits its scope between them.
Id. at 292.
133. Id. at 294.
134. See id. at 297, 298.
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of the direct loss of the use of his land or to other landowners because of
the general insecurity the regulation causes them. Disutility for the land-
owner affected by the condemnation would be reflected by personal ex-
pectations for future use of his land. For example, if a person purchased
undeveloped land and planned to develop it later, either for personal or
business reasons, disutility would be generated outside the market. Rea-
sonable expectations about land use would be frustrated-and thus sus-
ceptible to compensation-even though they were not registered in the
market.
In the case of intergenerational condemnation, the disutility caused
to present landowners in the form of uncertainty could be significant. If
the prospect of intergenerational condemnation disaffected a sufficient
number of landowners in the present generation, even its isolated use
could generate high uncertainty costs. Such uncertainty costs would typ-
ically arise from two sources.1 35 First, during the period when the state
was contemplating whether to use intergenerational condemnation, the
specific applications of the technique would be unknown. Until specific
uses were known, uncertainty would exist in any activities that might be
affected by intergenerational condemnation. 136 Second, once a specific
action was taken and the state failed to provide compensation, uncer-
tainty would be created about the similar uncompensated actions in the
future, thus diminishing the projected economic return of those persons
similarly situated.1 37 If landowners perceived the prospect of the use of
intergenerational condemnation as creating more uncertainty than envi-
ronmental, land use, or condemnation plans currently in use, greater dis-
utility would be created. In turn, this perception would lower future
profits as a result of less investment. A factor which would mitigate
against this, however, is that with respect to environmental preservation
only certain lands would be subject to intergenerational condemnation.
Urban developments and industrial centers where demoralization costs
would be higher would be excluded. In the case of historic preservation,
it seems plausible to suggest that the demoralization costs accruing from
such preservation would also be higher.
c. The third element: settlement costs
The role of settlement costs (i.e., the costs of time, effort, and re-
135. See Note, Uncertainty, supra note 114, at 1673-74.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1674.
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sources needed to pay compensation claims) in intergenerational con-
demnation assumes a position of increased complexity when compared to
the role of such costs in intragenerational condemnation, in which the
task of placing a value on the property interest taken is relatively easy.
In the latter situation, the state takes part of the landowner's bundle of
property rights, effectively creating a forced sale. Thus, the price paid is
what would prevail in an uncoerced sale in the market. Moreover, both
parties interact within the same time period.
In contrast, intergenerational condemnation creates a temporal
schism. The buyer is the next generation, and the seller is the present
generation. The state, in the interest of fairness, attempts to strike a bar-
gain between the two generations. The next generation, because it is not
yet in existence, must rely on the state to act in its behalf. The state, in
turn, can enforce the bargain through condemnation. The difficulty
arises because the buyer and the seller are not in the same time period; a
forced sale between different points in time is taking place. In addition,
the worth of the property interest is different in each time period. What
may be worth a great deal to the next generation for preservation may be
worth very little to the present generation for use.
In light of these distinctions, at least three different approaches
might be taken to evaluate the property interest taken.13 8 First, the focal
point could be the worth of the property interest taken to the present
generation. This approach would measure what the present generation
loses. The cost, of course, would tend to be small because it would con-
sist only of the present market value of the interest taken. Under this
approach, the state would have an incentive to use intergenerational con-
demnation. At the same time, however, such an approach would favor
the next generation by allowing it to use the state to gain a temporal
bargain over the present generation.
A second approach might consider what the next generation gains.
Under this analysis, the property interest would be assessed at the value
the next generation would attach to the property upon its receipt in the
future.13 9 Even though this value could only be an approximation, it is
likely that it would be significantly higher than the cost derived under the
138. For some related proposals, see Heller, supra note 73, at 459-64.
139. Benefits may accrue to nonusers as well as to users of the resource. Some economists have
argued that scenic wonders are a significant part of the real income of many individuals. Thus many
people would be willing to pay to retain an option to use such areas in their undeveloped state even
though the option might never be exercised. For a classical statement of this position, see Krutilla,
Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1967).
1986]
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
first approach. Similar to financing other acquisitions over time, the pay-
ment to the present landowner could be made by the next generation by a
bond-like process. The value of the property to the next generation could
be paid to the present property owner. The state would facilitate the
acquisition by selling bonds financed by future tax revenues. The present
landowner would receive the next generation's price, and the next gener-
ation, through the bonds, would pay the cost. This approach, however,
would also create a windfall for the property owner. In addition, the cost
might burden the next generation. The windfall to the landowner might
be cured by spreading it among society at large or by creating a subsidy
to conserve other land areas. However, even if this were done, the next
generation would still be burdened with a debt based on projections of
their desires by the present generation. The argument by the next gener-
ation would not be that it would be unwilling to pay for the benefits if the
projection were correct, since giving them the chance to bid in the pres-
ent market is the very purpose of intergenerational condemnation, but
that the projection would necessarily be ambiguous. This would restrict
the options of the next generation and magnify the consequences of any
errors in the projection of uses.
A third option might be to take an intermediate approach and, in
the process, attempt to ameliorate some of the problems of each of the
first two approaches. Instead of asking what the present generation
would lose or what the next generation would gain, it would attempt to
strike a more even bargain between the generations. This intermediate
approach would start with the gain to the next generation and then dis-
count it to some extent, not because of any conventional notions of cost-
benefit analysis, but because of any of the following four reasons: (1) the
necessary ambiguity in calculating the benefits to the next generation (a
scientific rationale); (2) a decision that the options of the next generation
for use should not be limited to those projected by the present generation
(a political rationale); (3) the belief that one generation cannot necessar-
ily be deemed more worthy than another generation (another political
rationale); and (4) such an approach would simultaneously avoid grant-
ing the present landowner a windfall and unduly burdening the next gen-
eration (both practical considerations). Under this approach, then, each
generation would give up something but would be compensated in some
degree for it. The present generation would be compensated in some de-
gree for the use it would otherwise make of the land in the interim period
following the time of the taking to the time of full alternative use by the
[Vol. 21:419
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next generation (when, presumably, the market value would be greater).
In return, the present generation would forego development of the land.
The next generation would give up some of its spending power and, in
return, would receive unspoiled land it could not otherwise have had. In
sum, the present generation would give up development but receive funds
it would not otherwise be entitled to, while the next generation would
give up funds but receive land it would not otherwise have been able to
preserve.
d. Application of the three elements
A possible model for the assessment of intergenerational condemna-
tion would take the following steps. First, the overall efficiency of a pro-
ject would be calculated. A projection of future benefits of a present
condemnation for preservation would be made on the basis of past uses,
current trends, and activities that have survived history. In addition,
population and growth trends would be studied. The final goal would be
to calculate a response to the following questions: in the next generation,
how many people would want to engage in activities that required unde-
veloped land, where would they want to perform such activities, and
what would they be willing to pay if the land were preserved now for the
later use of that activity rather than developed and therefore lost for such
uses? The worth of these benefits, pursuant to the Rawlsian constraint
on time preference, would not be discounted. Unless these benefits were
greater than either the demoralization costs or the settlement costs, the
project would not be undertaken. 14°
After this calculation had been made, the second step would be to
determine whether a taking had occurred (i.e., if settlement costs must be
paid to the present landowner). The demoralization costs to the present
generation from the use of intergenerational condemnation would be
compared to the settlement costs the present generation would receive
from the next generation. The intermediate settlement method previ-
ously suggested would be used and, therefore, would not only require a
payment to the present generation, but would also require some of the
worth of the benefits to the next generation to be discounted. If the de-
moralization costs were greater, settlement costs would be paid. In con-
trast, if the demoralization costs were less than the settlement costs, no
payment would be made. Another way of approaching the issue is that if
the benefits to the next generation were particularly high, and thus would
140. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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generate high settlement costs, intergenerational condemnation would be
appropriate. This approach would thus allow the use of intergenera-
tional condemnation for the preservation of particularly important
landmarks or undeveloped areas subject to unusual future demand.
When preservation is feasible, payment would more likely be necessary in
cases involving preservation of historic landmarks in an urban area (be-
cause of greater demoralization costs), while it would be comparatively
less likely in cases involving preservation of wilderness areas.' 4 '
CONCLUSION-INTERGENERATIONAL CONDEMNATION AND LAND
USE
The flaw that the proposed model for intergenerational condemna-
tion attempts to correct in the existing law is the failure to openly con-
sider the relevance of justice between generations. The model, once
accepted, could be applied to any land use setting where significant in-
tergenerational interests were present. Thus, a continuum of applicabil-
ity might be imagined. At one extreme would be areas, such as
wilderness preservation, where justice between generations is particularly
strong. Descending from this extreme would be other situations with less
significant aspects of intergenerational justice. At the other extreme
would be situations in which intergenerational concerns were negligible.
For example, the basic model might be applied to historic preservation,
141. Several options for payment could be used. One approach would be to utilize a special type
of bond financing. Initially, capital could be raised by selling bonds which would not mature until
the next generation. To protect the next generation from being put into excessive debt by the present
generation for present improvements, present statutes prohibit bond issues from extending beyond
twenty or thirty years. However, the purpose of the proposed "Future Improvement Bonds" would
be to provide future benefits and thus would justify the imposition of the debt. Interest could be
capitalized from proceeds received from the initial sale of bonds to cover the period of time before
the future generation began to pay for the benefits. Of course, this approach assumes a restructuring
of the present arbitrage regulations, which prohibit such a large portion of the bond proceeds from
being used for purposes other than capital expenditure. The next generation would be taxed on the
value of the development rights condemned on their behalf by the previous generation. The revenue
raised from the tax would be placed in a common sinking fund to pay the principal and interest on
the bonds which had been sold in the previous generation. If the revenues were greater than the
amount needed to retire the bond issue, the surplus could be used to pay the cost of this generation's
future condemnation. If there were insufficient funds, a new bond issue would be sold. The sinking
fund would be a perpetual one into which would be paid the tax revenues collected from the future
generation (when they are the present generation) for the benefits received from the prior genera-
tion's condemnation. This fund would pay the debt service on the bonds which had been sold to
finance the future condemnation. Other options might involve such schemes as an assignment of
future development rights in nonpreservation property (a type of intergenerational TDR that would
have a present market value) or a "reverse lien" on the property whereby the government promises
to pay a certain sum in the future (which would run with the land and increase the present market
value of the land).
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an area previously determined to be ripe for a consideration of justice
between generations. The preservation of an existing building, for exam-
ple, could be analyzed by keying upon two separate elements: present
market use and the preservation value to the next generation. If only the
current market use were considered, a landmark might be unnecessarily
destroyed, simply because the intergenerational element was not recog-
nized. But if the intergenerational model were applied in part, the result
might conform more closely to the desires of the relevant groups.
Similarly, many existing environmental programs at their base have
strong, but unanalyzed, considerations of justice between generations.
Most of the programs recognize, in a foggy way, the need to consider the
next generation and to take a less dogmatic view of the present, but the
source of that conflict-intergenerational justice-is not openly recog-
nized. Conventional models, although obviously valid in most cases, are
proffered as immutable rules. It is suggested that other, previously less
dominant, elements such as justice between generations must also be con-
sidered for a proper analysis.
The recognition of intergenerational condemnation as an additional
cause of action is a step towards correcting the inadequacy of current
takings clause jurisprudence. Certainly, the recognition of such a cate-
gory will not end the debate. Difficult questions will remain about how it
should be applied, its relationship to other categories, and a host of other
important concerns. 42 Thus, the recognition of intergenerational con-
142. Two areas, both of which relate to the role of the courts, would seem to be particularly
significant. One critical area would encompass problems related to theories of representation as
applied to future generations. In conventional political situations, claims may arise that a represen-
tative branch of government failed to fulfill its role and that judicial intervention was therefore
needed because representation of the people was, for some reason, problematic. See, e.g., Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985). As applied to intergenerational condem-
nation, application of this rationale might play a central role. Existing elective bodies can only
problematically represent the needs of the next generation. Following the Madisonian tradition, the
typical legislative body is structured so that the activities of the typical representative must be cen-
tered on re-election. See eg., D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). In
such a scheme, issues of concern to yet-to-be-born voters have little importance. As currently struc-
tured, the legislative bodies have little incentive to work on behalf of the next generation, especially
when the next generation's interests might diverge from the self-interests of the present electorate.
Under this analysis, therefore, it would be important to correct any representational defect. To
strengthen the position of future generations, such techniques as the appointment of attorneys to act
as guardians ad litem for the next generation in the argument of cases, cf C. STONE, SHOULD TREES
HAVE STANDING? (1972) (recommending, inter alia, the appointment of a guardian for natural
objects), the use of an agency-like Review Board staffed by persons from a variety of disciplines, see,
e.g., B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN
SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 156-61 (1974) (setting forth such a proposal for environ-
mental programs), or an activist role for the courts might be considered.
Another concern would be the treatment of intergenerational condemnation and redistribution
of wealth. In a "well-ordered" society, the prevailing distribution of wealth is generally deemed to
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demnation will not end the discussion about justice between generations,
but it can begin it. What lawyers talk about can only be effective when
the dialogue they employ directly considers the concerns behind legal
doctrine rather than merely talking around them. There are certainly
many ways to talk about intergenerational condemnation. The impor-
tant thing, however, is that it should begin.
be just. The ideal distribution may not be in effect, but the existing one is generally sufficient. If a
judge views this component as satisfied in society, he or she would not view the judicial role as
imparted with the power to deviate from the distributional changes which would follow the applica-
tion of intergenerational condemnation. Whether the persons in the present or next generation af-
fected by intergenerational condemnation were wealthy or poor would usually not be an issue of
concern. Cf. W. BAUMOL & W. OATEs, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 191-212 (1975)
(environmental programs generally good for allocation of resources rather than distribution of in-
come). A particularly egregious application, such as taking from many of the present poor to give to
a few of the future rich, might create a degree of uneasiness sufficient to incite judicial action, but the
usual position would be one of restraint. In contrast, a judge who viewed the prevailing distribution
of wealth as unjust would have ample potential for innovation in an intergenerational condemnation
case. If so inclined, a judge could systematically favor one segment of society over another. The
existing or future poor would be favored and the existing or future rich would not be favored (or,
conceivably vice versa). These scenarios could arise not only in the location of areas designated for
intergenerational condemnation, but also in the collection and distribution of monetary benefits.
